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ESSAYS
The Liberal Case Against
the Modern Class Action
Martin H. Redish*
Those who classify themselves as liberal generally favor widespread use
of class actions as a means of policing corporate misbehavior and protecting the
individual worker or consumer against capitalist excesses. In this Essay,
however, I take the counterintuitive position that while class action practice
could conceivably be modified in ways that make it far more acceptable than it
currently is, liberal political theory should be very skeptical of the modern class
action device as it currently exists. Defining the foundation of liberal thought
as a process-based belief in accountable democratic government and respect for
the right of individuals to protect their rights by resort to the judicial process, I
find that in all too many cases, the modern class action is substantially
inconsistent with this liberal ideal. In their current form, class actions often
serve as a means to deceptively alter existing substantive law through backdoor
procedural transformation. This undermines both foundational premises of
process-based liberalism.
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INTRODUCTION
It is hardly an overstatement that the modern class action is
widely deemed by political liberals as an important weapon to police
corporate misbehavior.1 Driven by a combination of a belief in pursuit
of the common good and a strong profit motive, plaintiffs’ class action
attorneys mount powerful attacks on equally powerful corporate
entities. Although one can seriously debate the individual merits of
each of these legal challenges, it is reasonable to assume that the liberal
agenda is generally furthered by the redistribution of wealth and the
penalization of corporate legal wrongdoing. In contrast, it is equally
reasonable to assume that, on the whole, political conservatives are
seriously troubled by what they deem the “legalized blackmail” that
results from many modern class actions.2
The Conservative Case for Class Actions, the recently published,
thoughtful, and provocative book by Professor Brian Fitzpatrick,
challenges this standard division.3 Fitzpatrick suggests that
conservatives should actually favor the use of class actions for a variety
of interesting (and controversial) reasons.4 In this Essay, I seek to
accomplish two goals. First, using Professor Fitzpatrick’s work as a
form of reverse inspiration, I seek to fashion a mirror image argument—
one that is equally out of the ordinary. I will make the liberal case
against the modern class action. Second, I raise serious doubts about
the logic employed by Fitzpatrick in concluding that conservatives
should favor the use of class actions. To be sure, in critiquing the

1.
See Daniel Fisher, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2010),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/opinions-law-constitution-courts-ideas-opinions.html#
36706cd81751 [https://perma.cc/7TL6-SE86] (“[Class action] lawyers say the class action is an
indispensable tool for disciplining corporations run amok.”).
2.
For a discussion of the class action as legalized blackmail, see generally Bruce Hay &
David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000).
3.
BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS (2019).
4.
See infra Part III.
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conservative case for the class action, I am in uncharted territory.
Unlike Fitzpatrick, I do not begin with the assumption of a conservative
perspective. But assuming, solely for purposes of argument, that we are
seeking to further conservative values, I am mystified by Professor
Fitzpatrick’s conclusion. To the extent conservatives are willing to
accept any form of regulation in place of the invisible hand of the
market, I cannot imagine how they would prefer the self-interested,
unpredictable form of regulation implemented by the modern class
action, whatever their reservations about direct governmental
regulation.
This Essay is divided into three parts. In Part I, I devote
substantial attention to defining the term “liberal.” One can only make
a coherent liberal case against the modern class action if one explains
what is meant by “liberal.” And my definition may not be the same as
everyone else’s. As I explain, I define liberal as a form of governmental
process that has a commitment to consent of the governed as its
foundation. This foundational premise in turn leads to an instrumental
commitment (at least on subconstitutional issues) to rule solely by those
representative of and accountable to the electorate.5 This commitment
requires that voters be able to judge their elected officials by how they
vote on legislation that matters to them.
This process-based understanding of liberalism differs from the
more substantive version, which identifies as “liberal” a set of
substantive goals and values largely agreed upon by most who refer to
themselves as liberal: Medicare for all (or, perhaps, all who need it),
concern over climate change, recognition of a need for gun control,
avoidance of endless wars, etc. But forced imposition of a set of so-called
liberal goals on an unwilling electorate would give rise to an untenable
theoretical oxymoron: a form of fascist liberalism. Hence, while we can
debate what substantive goals and programs are or are not “liberal,”
the foundational necessary condition for a commitment to liberalism is
an overriding recognition of rule by the people and respect for the
individual’s role in helping to influence governmental policies.6
Recognition of the essentially process-based nature of liberalism
leads to Part II of this Essay, which fashions a process-based attack on
the modern class action.7 This attack, I should emphasize, is not aimed
at the abstract concept of a class action. Nor does it necessarily focus on
5.
See infra Part I.
6.
Professor Fitzpatrick’s responding essay expresses confusion as to how I am able to
characterize my critique of the modern class action as “liberal.” Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Why Class
Actions Are Something both Liberals and Conservatives Can Love, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1147, 1147
(2020). In response, all I can do is urge him to reread the above paragraph.
7.
See infra Part II.
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all class actions. The point, rather, is that as presently structured, the
class action device either requires or permits forms of multiparty
representative litigation that seriously threaten core notions of processbased liberalism. Mandatory classes8 and opt-out inclusion9 also raise
serious concerns from the perspective of process-based liberalism.
Of greatest concern, however, is the problem of what I refer to
as the “faux” class action.10 In such proceedings, most of the class
members are little more than cardboard cutouts of actual class
members. To be sure, the class members actually exist. But because of
the relatively small value of the claims and the often considerable
difficulty in identifying class members, the likelihood that they will ever
be aware they are class members, much less actually recover for the
harm they suffered, is very small. But this problem fails to prevent class
certification. Either through adjudication or (more likely) settlement,
the suit is resolved, the defendants “compensate” as if all class members
will receive the money due them, and class attorneys are compensated
by reference to the full amount awarded.
What happens to the often significant amount of money left over
after class members are given the opportunity to recover? In recent
years, it has been donated to some deserving charity under a doctrine
known as cy pres—derived from a French phrase meaning “second
best.” The problem, however, is that the charity has never been injured
by the defendants, and the only compensatory method authorized by
the underlying substantive law—usually, state or federal statutes—is
compensation to the injured victims. This perversion of the underlying
law being enforced through resort to a backdoor procedural shell game
takes place without the voters being aware of the fundamental change
in the DNA of the laws on which their legislators voted. Is there a big
difference between a legislator voting for a law that requires
wrongdoers to compensate those whom they injured on the one hand
and a law requiring wrongdoers to pay uninjured attorneys and
uninjured charities? You bet there is—or, at least, there may well be.
Yet through the purely procedural device of a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure, the underlying essence of the substantive law being enforced
is significantly transformed. This, I submit, represents a serious threat
to the foundations of the democratic process: representativeness and
accountability of those chosen by the people to enact laws impacting
8.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2).
9.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
10. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 24 (2009) (“[I]n [faux class actions], as a practical matter,
it is the private attorneys who initiate suit and who are the only ones rewarded for exposing the
defendants’ law violations.”).
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social or economic behavior. In effect, it amounts to a form of legislative
deception—most assuredly giving rise to a pathological threat to
democracy. In Part II, I elaborate on both the nature of process-based
liberalism in a democratic society and the manner in which the modern
class action, in all too many cases, presents a serious threat to those
process-based values by altering the fundamental remedial scheme
expressly enacted by an authorized legislative body.
In Part III, I assume the hypothetical (and unfamiliar) role of a
conservative. Through a conservative’s eyes, I examine Professor
Fitzpatrick’s arguments as to why my conservative self should welcome
the modern class action as perhaps the least of all possible regulatory
evils.11 Professor Fitzpatrick acknowledges the need to deter corporate
misdeeds—something on which he and liberals can comfortably agree.
Yet, my conservative reaction to these arguments is, at best, one of
skepticism. If a conservative believes that some or even all
governmental regulation is improper or ill-advised as an interference
with the free market, then I cannot imagine why he or she should prefer
the often Wild West–like, self-interested clash or bargains between
profit-motivated plaintiffs’ lawyers and large companies. The results
are likely to amount either to too much or too little regulation. If
somehow the strategic game of chess between these two actually
amounts to just the right amount of regulation, it will be through no
fault of logic or reason.
Professor Fitzpatrick himself seems to acknowledge the serious
problems that plague the modern class action, since he proposes
significant, even dramatic alterations to the procedural device. I agree
with many of these suggested reforms. But if he is suggesting that even
absent implementation of such reforms the modern class action remains
the best regulatory alternative, I believe both my true liberal self and
my hypothetical conservative self would be forced to disagree with him.
I. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A “LIBERAL”?
One, of course, cannot rationally claim to be fashioning a liberal
attack on the modern class action without first defining what one means
by “liberal.” If one were to survey one thousand well-educated
individuals who consider themselves to be liberal, one would likely
receive responses that consisted primarily, if not exclusively, of a list of
specific political and social programs: gun control, universal health
care, increased protections and opportunities for racial minorities,
tolerance of diverse sexual preferences, and so on. It would be difficult
11. See infra Part III.
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to argue with such responses, at least as a matter of modern-day
politics. But what if these same individuals were asked whether an
unrepresentative, unaccountable, unelected dictatorial government
could be deemed “liberal” if it imposed such programs by fiat on an
unwilling society? Hardly. One could arguably believe that support for
the substantive progressive political platform constitutes a necessary
condition for liberalism, but surely it cannot be deemed a sufficient
condition. An equally necessary condition for liberalism, I submit, is a
government chosen by and accountable to the people. To be sure, a wise
democratic government will likely establish some form of
countermajoritarian constitutional limitation on majoritarian power,
much as our own society has done. But if so, as I have argued in prior
writing, it is for the paradoxical reason that accountable democratic
government can only be preserved by imposition of some form of
regulation that is insulated from democratic rule.12
It is important to distinguish liberalism from such leftist
programs as socialism or communism. Indeed, the well-known liberal
organization, Americans for Democratic Action, was formed in the
1940s as an alternative to the expansion of the American Communist
Party.13 The organization’s famous founders rejected communism,
primarily because of its failure to require a democratically accountable
form of government.14
The modern political philosopher most associated with liberal
thought, John Rawls, has likewise focused on the existence of a truly
representative form of government as the essence of liberal political
philosophy. In his most famous work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls adopts
what he call his “First Principle,” which mandates that “[e]ach person
is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”15
Rawls includes within the concept of basic liberty such foundational
freedoms as the right to vote, the rights of freedom of speech and
assembly, the liberty of conscience, and freedom of thought.16 These are
the key rights designed to enable citizens to develop and exercise their

12. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: A DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2017) (arguing that the American constitutional
democratic system can only function effectively with vigilant enforcement of judicial
independence).
13. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE
MCCARTHY ERA 14 (2005).
14. See id. (“Americans for Democratic Action, an organization that had been founded by
many of the leading liberals of the period, expressly excluded communists from membership.”).
15. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 250 (reprt. ed. 2005).
16. Id. at 61.
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intellectual and moral powers and to judge society and its policies.17 In
his later work, Rawls recast his definition of a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties in political terms, including such liberties as
political liberties, freedom of association, freedoms specified by the
liberty and integrity of the person, and rights and liberties covered by
the rule of law.18
It is important to distinguish this rights-based form of liberal
political theory from the modern political philosophy of libertarianism.
It is true that any legitimate form of libertarianism would likely include
a process-based mode of liberalism. But libertarianism generally goes
much further, including within its protective reach such substantive
liberties as economic freedom, freedom to bear arms, or freedom to use
drugs. Process-based liberalism is best described as a form of metalibertarianism—the liberty to participate in the process of liberty. It is
this form of liberty that is essential to the continued viability of a
constitutional democracy. It is to be distinguished from substantive
libertarianism—the rights to use drugs, not to wear crash helmets, or
to own guns, for example. One may or may not accept those rights as a
legal or normative matter; that is an issue for another day. Rather, it is
those liberties directly involved in the continued operation of the
democratic process which liberal theory necessarily embraces.
With this foundational understanding of the core notions of
liberal political theory now established, it is possible to test the modern
class action against it. As the following Part shows, while the abstract
concept of the class action is not necessarily inconsistent with political
liberalism, both the manner in which it has been formally shaped and
the manner in which it has functioned in the real world all too often
raise serious concerns from the perspective of liberal values. And the
irony of this fact should not be lost. Today, most in the legal world who
describe themselves as liberal strongly support widespread use of the
modern class action, because it serves as an effective check on the
illegality of corporate behavior. Regulation of big business to assure
compliance with law and to protect otherwise defenseless individuals
against corporate power, it is safe to say, is central to the modern
substantive liberal political agenda. But in seeking to achieve this end,
the modern class action too often undermines core notions of
representative and accountable government and, therefore, the
foundational premises of process-based liberalism.

17. See id.
18. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 310–34 (1993).
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II. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION AND PROCESS-BASED LIBERALISM
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the class action,
in the abstract, is not inherently inconsistent with political liberalism.
A complex procedural aggregation device that enables plaintiffs
possessing parallel claims or claims arising out of the same allegedly
illegal behavior by the same defendant or group of defendants is
pragmatically attractive and consistent with the promotion of
substantive justice and the rule of law. Too often, however, the system
has been corrupted in pathological ways, either because Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires this result or
because Rule 23 fails to protect against it.
The ways in which the modern class action threatens or
undermines liberal political values can be grouped under two broad
headings: (1) legislative deception19 and (2) corrupted individualism.
The former operates on a macro level, since it negatively impacts
democratic society as a whole, while the latter functions on a micro
level, because its pathological impact is on the individual citizen’s
ability to exercise his or her meta-liberty to participate in the
democratic governmental processes as a means of furthering or
protecting his or her interests.
A. The Political Pathology of Legislative Deception
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are just that—rules of
procedure, and nothing more. They are promulgated pursuant to, and
limited by, the Rules Enabling Act, which restricts them by expressly
prohibiting them from abridging, enlarging, or modifying a substantive
right.20 The most likely reason for this congressionally imposed
limitation is the core premise of liberal democracy, the accountability of
those who govern to those whom they were elected to represent. We do
not allow legislators to cast secret ballots, for example, because our
system operates on the assumption that the voters determine whether
they wish to retain their elected representatives, at least in part, on
whether they agree with how those representatives voted on particular
pieces of legislation.

19. See generally Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception,
Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States
v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2006) (describing the precept of American political theory that
“the judiciary has the constitutional power and obligation to assure that Congress has not deceived
the electorate as to the manner in which its legislation actually alters the preexisting legal,
political, social, or economic topography”).
20. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
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Of course, not every voter will care about every, or even most,
legislative votes cast by their elected representatives. But it would be
dangerous and wrongheaded to casually dismiss the notion of
democratic accountability. Much like advertising, where it is often said
that half of advertising is useless but no one knows which half,21 it is
likely that some voters care about some bills and it is effectively
impossible to determine, either ex ante or ex post, which bills which
voters care about. For example, surely there are voters who care about
how their representatives vote on bills concerning women’s
reproductive rights, or the environment, or how unions are treated, or
how religious institutions are dealt with. But even on less well-known
or controversial legislative proposals, there may well be pockets of
voters who are members of interest groups that care about each one.
Because there is no feasible way for any of us to determine which bills
voters care about and which they do not, it is essential for us to assume
that some voters care about each one. It is therefore essential, for
representative liberal democracy to function properly, that substantive
legislation be implemented and enforced in the manner contemplated
in and directed by what is contained in the four corners of the statute.
To be sure, issues of textual interpretation will on occasion arise over
which reasonable people will differ. But it is certain that a law which
provides “X” cannot properly be judicially construed to mean “Y,” or “not
X.” To do so would amount to a backdoor judicial manipulation of the
substance of the law enacted by the people’s elected representatives.
Just as importantly, it would amount to a serious subversion of
representative democracy, because the electorate will be misled as to
what the controlling law actually is. Even more troubling is that the
substantive law duly enacted by the people’s representatives will have
been distorted by those whose job it was to faithfully implement it.
Every legislatively enacted substantive prohibition on or
regulation of citizens’ primary behavior22 necessarily contains within it
two elements: the proscriptive and the remedial. The former describes
the prohibited or regulated behavior, and the latter refers to the
penalties or negative consequences that flow from a violation of the
behavioral proscription. Both elements represent inherent parts of the

21. John Wanamaker famously claimed, “Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted;
the trouble is I don’t know which half.” See John Wanamaker, QUOTATIONS PAGE,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/John_Wanamaker/
(last
visited
May
7,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/4TPY-EH4X].
22. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing HENRY M.
HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1953))
(arguing substantive laws are those which affect “primary decisions respecting human conduct”).
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substantive law which either Congress or a state legislature has
enacted.
A legislative body has a variety of alternatives available to it in
shaping a remedial model. It can choose from permutations or
combinations of a number of conceivable penalties for violation of a
substantive behavioral proscription: criminal conviction, civil fines,
administrative penalization, or an award of compensatory damages. A
legislature can also choose to establish a form of qui tam remedy, as it
has in the current whistleblower statute, the False Claims Act.23 Under
this framework, an uninjured party may be compensated for choosing
to pursue a valid specified civil claim against a culpable defendant.24
A backdoor judicial alteration in the DNA of either the
proscriptive or the remedial elements of legislation is properly viewed
as a serious undermining of liberal democratic institutions. Voters may
well care as much about the remedial as the proscriptive elements. For
example, whether a law imposes a penalty of life imprisonment or a
slap-on-the-wrist civil fine may well be the subject of political debate.
Similarly, imposition on corporate wrongdoers of an obligation to
compensate injured victims may well be far more palatable to the voters
than requiring those wrongdoers to do nothing more than pay large
amounts to uninjured plaintiffs’ lawyers, or even to uninjured charities
only tangentially or remotely related to the unlawful harm committed.
Thus, for a procedural mechanism like the class action to
surreptitiously convert a legislative scheme designed to compensate
injured victims into a form of indirect civil fine or qui tam structure
constitutes a serious distortion of liberal democracy.
B. How the Modern Class Action Alters the
DNA of Underlying Substantive Law
Though I have already made the point multiple times, it is worth
reiterating it at this point: I am not suggesting that all class actions
inherently undermine or distort the underlying substantive law being
enforced. My point, rather, is that all too often, that is exactly the case.
In order to prove this point, the place to begin is with Professor
John Coffee’s taxonomy of the modern class action. A number of years
ago, Professor Coffee divided the modern class action into three

23. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(b) (2012).
24. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 81; see also Vermont
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (noting “the long
tradition of qui tam actions in England and the American Colonies”).
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categories, “Type A,” “Type B,” and “Type C” class actions.25 Type A
class actions are those in which the individual claims of the class
members are sufficiently large in amount that if there were no class
action, they could be brought as viable individual claims.26 In other
words, these claims are of an amount sufficient to justify an attorney’s
time in pursuing them on their own. They are what can be called
“positive value” claims. Type B claims, or “negative value” claims, are
not sufficiently large to justify individual suits.27 “Type C” claims,
according to Coffee, involve a mixture of Type A and Type B claims.28
While Professor Coffee’s trichotomy is valuable for its structural
insights, his categorizations omit a very important category of claims:
those that are so small that they cannot stand on their own and it
simply is not worth the cost for claimants even to bother to file a claim
or for the attorneys to find the claimants. Classes predominantly made
up of claims falling into this fourth category, I believe, are appropriately
labeled “faux” class actions.29 They amount to a cardboard cutout of a
real class: from a distance, it looks like a real class, but upon closer
examination it is seen not to be real. The claimants are, in an important
sense, comatose: not only do they fail to stand on their own, but also it
is simply not worth the cost for claimants even to file a claim or for the
attorneys to attempt to find the claimants.30 Alternatively, many who
fall within the class’s description are difficult to ascertain, either in
name or location.31 Yet the amount of any award or settlement and, in
turn, the fee amount awarded to class attorneys, will be determined on
the basis of the size of this faux class. Obviously, a significant portion
of the total amount awarded will go unclaimed. The underlying
substantive law being enforced, which dictates that the remedy for
violation be compensation of those injured, will have been ignored. And
everyone involved, from the moment the class was certified, will know
this.
What happens to the unclaimed funds, which are often of a very
significant amount? Theoretically, one could persuasively argue that
they should be returned to the defendant: the defendant’s obligation
under controlling substantive law is solely to compensate injured
25. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 904–06 (1987).
26. Id. at 904–05.
27. Id. at 905.
28. Id. at 905–06.
29. See generally Redish, supra note 24 (explaining “faux” class actions as those where the
bulk of the class members have claims so small that it will effectively be impossible to compensate
them).
30. REDISH, supra note 10, at 24.
31. Id. at 24–25.
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victims, and unless and until those victims can be discovered, there is
no basis on which to take money from the defendant. The optics of this
result, however, are obviously bad, and I am unaware of any situation
where this course of action was adopted. Rather, from the very
beginning of the process, everyone involved is aware that the money
will either escheat to the state or, more likely, be awarded to a charity
that supposedly is related in some way—no matter how attenuated—to
the subject of the suit.32 No one seems to care that the charity has not
been injured in any way and, indeed, has absolutely nothing to do with
either the lawsuit or the events that gave rise to that lawsuit.
This form of remedy is known as cy pres, derived from a French
phrase that means “the second best” or “the best possible.”33 As a legal
concept, cy pres developed in the law of trusts and estates, having
nothing to do with litigation. In the early 1970s, however, courts—in an
attempt to insert the proverbial square peg into a round hole—began to
borrow the concept for the context of litigation.34 Courts did so under
the auspices of Rule 23 alone; no substantive statute being enforced in
the class proceeding made even the slightest reference to such a form of
supposedly “second best” remedy.35 To the contrary, those laws provide
solely for compensation to the victims. Yet by enforcing a procedural
rule, the courts—with the encouragement of plaintiffs’ lawyers and
often even defendants’ lawyers36—effectively perform the legal
equivalent of transforming straw into gold by changing the DNA of the
underlying substantive law properly enacted through the democratic
process.
Such a practice should be held unconstitutional as a violation of
separation of powers: courts have absolutely no authority to alter,
ignore, or transform constitutionally valid substantive legislation. One
likely need not reach that constitutional issue, however, because the
practice obviously violates the unambiguous directive of the Rules
Enabling Act that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “not abridge,
enlarge or modify [a] substantive right.”37 If Rule 23 were to be
construed to enable a court to ignore or transform the remedial element
of a substantive law being enforced in a class proceeding, Rule 23 would
violate that legislative directive. A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is
32. Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies
of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 649 (2010).
33. See id. at 624.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 624, 634–35.
36. Defendants’ lawyers have often concurred in the court’s resort to cy pres as part of their
effort to obtain a settlement with the plaintiff class.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
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just that—a procedural rule. It is simply too small a tail to wag such a
large dog.38
From the perspective of process-based liberalism,39 such
backdoor procedural manipulation of underlying substantive law
pathologically undermines core premises of representative democracy.
Democratic institutions have chosen to enact into law a specific form of
remedy: compensation for victims. And without even intimating that
such a remedial model is unconstitutional, courts transform the law to
create a perverse combination of civil fine and qui tam relief. It involves
a civil fine because while the defendant is required to suffer a financial
penalty, some of the money it pays goes to a wholly uninjured party. It
is the equivalent of a court fining a defendant and directing her to pay
the money to the Red Cross. It smacks of qui tam, because plaintiffs’
attorneys receive significant compensation for no reason other than
they pursued the case, even though truly injured parties remain
uncompensated for the most part.
Would the public likely care about this perversion of the
explicitly directed remedial model? I suppose one could debate the
answer. On the one hand, many who consider themselves to be liberal
would likely endorse the result, because their goal would be primarily
to police and control illegal corporate behavior. But there is no doubt
that many members of the public are not fans of plaintiff class action
attorneys, rightly or wrongly. If the underlying substantive law had
explicitly provided that the result of a class proceeding would be that
true victims would not be compensated but instead plaintiff class
attorneys would receive significant amounts of the penalty imposed on
defendants, it is by no means clear that the public would have supported
38. More recently, some courts, possibly pressured by the widespread attacks on cy pres, have
shifted to an alternative method of dealing with unclaimed funds: distributing unclaimed funds
among those claimants who did in fact file. The American Law Institute has proposed distribution
of undistributed funds in this manner. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 3.07(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2019):
If the settlement involves individual distributions to class members and funds remain
after distributions . . . the settlement should presumptively provide for further
distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are too small
to make individual distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist that
would make such further distributions impossible or unfair.
But in many cases, this alternative will be almost as problematic as cy pres. While these plaintiffs
have presumably been injured, their injuries are limited to the actual loss suffered (perhaps
augmented by treble damage awards or punitive damage awards, depending on the specific
substantive law being invoked). But surely they have not been injured in the absurdly large
amounts that could potentially be bestowed on them. And those excess amounts are available
solely because other claimants have not been compensated. Such an approach views class members
not as individuals deserving of justice, but rather as faceless, fungible masses.
39. See discussion supra Part I (discussing process-based liberalism and its place within
theories of political liberalism).
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such a law. At the very least, we cannot be certain one way or the other.
The result of the process in such faux class actions, then, constitutes an
unambiguous perversion of the essence of liberal democracy.
I should emphasize once again that by no means do all modern
class actions fall within the faux category I have described. Classes that
qualify as what Professor Coffee referred to as Type A classes40 would
not fall within the faux category, because the amounts of the individual
claims are, by definition, sufficiently large to justify individual suit.
Class members are therefore almost certainly going to be interested in
and aware of the class proceeding that will determine their rights. Even
Type B claims, where the individual claims are insufficient to justify
individual suit, may escape the faux label where, due to the
circumstances of the situation, class members are relatively easily
ascertainable. But it would be incorrect to assume that the large
majority of modern class actions are not faux class actions. They remain
a significant problem for process-based liberal democracy.
Is there a means to avoid faux classes? It would be extremely
easy to do so. We could simply add to Rule 23(a) the requirement that
before a class may be certified, named plaintiffs establish that
“meaningful relief” could be given to the members of the class. Choice
of the standard “meaningful relief” intentionally implies some room for
judicial discretion. Rarely will a class be either clearly faux or not faux.
In most instances, a certain portion of the class is likely to be interested
or ascertainable and compensated with relative ease. It would be up to
the court to determine, on the basis of the showing made by plaintiffs’
attorneys, whether a significantly large portion of the class is likely to
be compensated. But where the percentage of compensated class
members is likely in the single digits, the class most surely should not
be certified. For reasons I am unable to grasp, however, the Rules
Advisory Committee appears unwilling to even consider the propriety
of such an amendment to Rule 23(a).
C. Mandatory Class Actions and Individualist Liberalism
Commitment to democracy may fall within a variety of forms. A
communitarian form of democracy, for example, places relatively little
emphasis on the rights of the individual member of society. Rather, its
primary concern is with maintaining the community’s ability to selfdetermine.41 But it is my belief that a truly liberal form of democracy is

40. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
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properly grounded in a moral commitment to the worth of the individual
member of society as an integral whole, worthy of respect and fair
treatment. It should be noted once again that such a commitment to
individualist liberalism is by no means the same thing as a commitment
to modern libertarianism. Rather, it represents only acceptance of
meta-libertarianism—that is, the right to participate freely in the
processes of liberty. Thus, individualist liberalism concerns the freedom
of the individual to participate in the process of choosing those who
govern, and in petitioning the government for rulings or legislation that
will advance the individual’s moral beliefs or personal interests. While
this is not the time or place to justify a choice in favor of liberal
democracy over communitarian democracy, it is worth noting the
communitarian’s failure to recognize the obvious: the fact that the
community is made up of individuals.42 For present purposes, it is
sufficient to establish that process-based liberalism necessarily
includes recognition of the individual citizen’s worth and value, as well
as the individual citizen’s role in choosing and petitioning those who
govern.
In a number of situations, the modern class action (even in
contexts other than the faux class action) contravenes core notions of
liberalism. Rule 23(b) creates four categories of class actions, and three
of them establish mandatory classes.43 A “mandatory” class prohibits
all class members from removing themselves from the class, even if they
fervently wish to do so. As a result, individual class members’ rights are
to be litigated by class counsel as chosen by the court,44 even if they
wish to use only their own lawyer with a totally different legal strategy.
This is of course an especially serious problem in Type A classes, where
the individual claims are often substantial. By paternalistically forcing
individual class members to litigate their claims only as part of a large
group without any realistic opportunity to control the manner of
litigation, mandatory classes violate due process and are therefore
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the due process challenge
to mandatory classes.45 It has conspicuously construed the mandatory
42. For a detailed examination of the alternative theories of democracy, including adversary
democracy, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013).
43. The three categories of mandatory classes are Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2). A detailed discussion of the substance of the Rule 23(b) categories
is beyond the scope of this essay. For a detailed explanation of these categories in this context, see
REDISH, supra note 10, at 135–75.
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1).
45. At one point the Court did agree to consider the issue, but ultimately dismissed certiorari
as having been improvidently granted. See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.
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categories in a narrow manner, however, likely because of the Justices’
unease with such a constitutionally questionable frontal assault on
litigant autonomy.46
D. The Irony of the Liberal-Capitalist Critique of
the Modern Class Action
In prior scholarship, I proposed as the proper theoretical
rationale of the modern class action what I called the “guardianship
model.”47 Under this framework, class attorneys are properly viewed as
the guardians of the interests of passive class members who have
allegedly been injured by a corporate defendant.48 In so doing, they can
reasonably be deemed to be furthering liberal values by protecting the
interests of the little person against potential corporate bullies. But
ironically, the guardians’ motivation will often be—at least in
significant part—grounded in a capitalist-driven profit motivation.
There is nothing inherently wrong with this; people should be
allowed to do well by doing good. However, if economic externalities are
allowed to pervert those capitalistic incentives, then the liberal interest
in protecting vulnerable individuals is easily and dangerously
subverted. And the modern class action is plagued with such
externalities. Indeed, the very fact that class attorneys are
compensated by reference to the amount awarded to the class as a
whole, rather than with reference to the amount actually paid to class
members, reduces class attorney incentives to locate and compensate
individual class members. Equally threatening to the capitalistic
incentives supposedly driving class attorneys is the very existence of cy
pres relief.49
The easiest way to preserve the process-based values of
liberalism, ironically, is to measure the validity of any class action
procedure by whether it furthers or reduces the capitalistic profit
incentive of class attorneys to protect the interests of real plaintiff class
members. All too often, the modern class action fails this paradoxical
capitalistic test of process-based liberalism.
1992) (holding that due process required an opportunity for plaintiff to remove himself from the
class where forum court had personal jurisdiction over plaintiff), cert. granted in part, 510 U.S.
810 (1993), cert. dismissed per curiam as improvidently granted, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (construing narrowly
Rule 23(b)(2)); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) (construing narrowly Rule
23(b)(1)(B)).
47. Martin H. Redish, Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of
Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process, 64 EMORY L.J. 451, 453 (2014).
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
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III. THE DUBIOUS CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
I am hardly the one to critique the conservative case for class
actions, in light of the fact that, at least on a political level, I most
certainly would never describe myself as a conservative. Nevertheless,
if I were to begin my normative analysis by assuming the validity of
what I understand to be basic conservative political values, I must say
I am puzzled by any sympathy a conservative would have for modern
class procedures.
Perhaps the argument is grounded in a sort of zero-sum game.
Conservatives generally believe in the wisdom of the market, and that
belief is accompanied by mistrust of government. Because conservatives
dislike direct governmental regulation, they might choose to reject such
regulatory programs in favor of the more indirect regulation imposed
by the class action. The first problem with such reasoning, of course, is
the assumption that regulation is a zero-sum game. The mere fact that
one chooses to reject direct regulation does not necessarily imply
acceptance of regulation through class actions. And one should never
forget that the regulation imposed by class actions is an important form
of governmental regulation. The laws being enforced are generally
enacted by the legislative branch of government, and those laws are
being enforced by yet another branch, the judiciary. A conservative
could, then, just as easily reject all forms of governmental regulation,
preferring instead to place almost full reliance on the market, with the
assistance of individual litigations to enforce substantive legislative
regulation.
Conservatives might well argue that regulators are inherently
biased in favor of regulation, because, after all, that is their job. I myself
have raised such concerns in the context of a procedural due process
analysis.50 But is it preferable, from the conservative perspective, to
have regulation imposed through the efforts of financially incentivized
private class action attorneys, motivated not by neutrality but
primarily, if not exclusively, by personal profit? To be sure, in the
abstract, conservatives strongly believe in profit-incentivized activity;
that, after all, is the theory of the market. But surely we do not desire
adjudicators—required by due process to be neutral51—to be

50. Martin H. Redish & Kristin McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the Administrative
State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 297, 312–13 (2018).
51. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (“Every procedure which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant . . . denies the latter due process of law.”). See generally Martin H. Redish & Lawrence

1144

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4:1127

incentivized by profit, which is to be determined solely on the basis of
which side wins. And these private class action attorneys are
empowered with the legal equivalent of a nuclear weapon: what some
refer to as a form of legalized extortion—a “bet the company” class
action.52 As a result, the resolution of the suit is generally not through
reasoned judicial decision but by settlement. Moreover, while Rule 23
requires judicial approval of all class settlements,53 it would probably
not be unfair to suggest that all too often, class actions end with either
regulation by intimidation (where defendants feel forced to settle
because the risks of litigation are just too great) or by collusion (where
defendants and plaintiffs end in suspicious agreement). It is, then,
difficult to understand why a conservative would prefer such a “Wild
West” form of unpredictable regulation that, of course, takes place only
after substantial injuries may have been suffered, perhaps due to the
absence of pre-injury governmental regulation.
Professor Fitzpatrick, as a conservative, favors class actions for
much the same reason that substantive liberals do: because they deter
corporate misbehavior.54 But they also may distort the market in
pathological ways. For example, they may actually overdeter.
Corporations may be chilled from marketing beneficial products, for
fear of the dangers of class actions brought for no reason other than
profit motivation. There will be situations where a class action lacks
merit, but its very threat shapes corporate behavior in perverse ways.
More importantly, neither Professor Fitzpatrick nor any of his
conservative comrades who endorse class actions (how many there are,
I do not know) have responded to the alchemy of the modern class
action: transforming a compensatory remedial model in a substantive
statute into an entirely different, noncompensatory remedial model.
The natural response of both liberals and conservatives who
support class actions is to ask rhetorically, isn’t it better to provide some
relief than none at all? Isn’t it better at least to achieve corporate
deterrence, even if we are not able to provide meaningful compensation
to the large (often very large) majority of class members? The problem
with this nakedly utilitarian argument is that the Rules Enabling Act
does not provide that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure may not enlarge,
modify, or abridge a substantive right unless there is a really good
pragmatic reason to do so. Rather, the statute unqualifiedly prohibits
C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J.
455 (1986).
52. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297–99 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the
“intense pressure to settle” caused by the filing of a class action).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
54. FITZPATRICK, supra note 3, at 99–113.
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any such activity by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.55 In this context,
it must once again be emphasized that a lawsuit does not “arise under”
Rule 23; that is nothing more than a rule of procedure. Rather, the suit
arises under the underlying substantive law being invoked. More
importantly, this solution swims fatally halfway across a river. To allow
courts to selectively enforce only part of a law inevitably transforms
that law into something for which those accountable to the electorate
never voted. If those laws turn out to be ineffective means of achieving
their intended ends, then in our constitutional democracy it is up to the
political branches to reshape them. It cannot be achieved through the
alternative method of resorting to a cynical procedural shell game.
The most noteworthy aspect of Professor Fitzpatrick’s
endorsement of class actions, however, is the numerous qualifiers which
he attaches to his support. Towards the close of his book, Professor
Fitzpatrick suggests numerous means of reforming the class action—
many of which (for example, limiting class attorney compensation to a
percentage of the amount actually claimed, rather than the amount
awarded) would go far to removing many of the pathologies and
perverse economic incentives that plague existing class procedures.
Whether they go far enough one could debate. Absent acceptance of my
suggested ex ante requirement of demonstrating the realistic possibility
of meaningful class-wide relief, I fail to see how the process could be
deemed acceptable. But of greater importance is this one obvious fact,
“hidden” in plain sight: the version of the class action Professor
Fitzpatrick supports does not exist, nor is there any likelihood that it will
in the foreseeable future. Thus, when Professor Fitzpatrick seeks to
make the conservative case for the class action, one must wonder
whether he really means the conservative case for the hypothetical
reformed class action that he envisions—which, at least for the present
time, is nothing more than a procedural mirage.
CONCLUSION: THE DANGER OF RESULT-ORIENTED LIBERALISM
Many who classify themselves as liberal often measure
governmental actions solely in terms of results: a government cannot
be deemed “liberal” unless it has adopted a specific set of programs that
achieve liberal ends. And I understand how easy it is to focus
exclusively on whether or not the program being implemented furthers
one’s own social values. I am even willing to concede that adoption of
such a political agenda could be deemed a necessary condition of a truly
liberal society. But the fact that it is a necessary condition, of course,
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
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does not mean it is also a sufficient condition. And it most certainly is
not. As noted at the outset of this Essay, authoritarian imposition of
“liberal” social programs on an unwilling society amounts to an
oxymoron: fascist liberalism. At least as necessary an element to any
truly liberal society is the noun that must follow the adjective
“liberal”—and that noun is “democracy.”
As I have shown in this Essay, the modern class action all too
often (though concededly not always) amounts to a procedural end run
around the remedial choices adopted in the substantive laws being
enforced in the class proceeding. If the remedial models adopted
through the democratic process are to be modified or replaced, it must
be through the same democratic processes that enacted them in the first
place, not through a secretive and confusing procedural process of
alchemy.

